SUMMARY Asynchronous, distributed, decision-making (ADDM) systems constitute a special class of distributed problems and are characterized as large, complex systems wherein the principal elements are the geographically-dispersed entities that communicate among themselves, asynchronously, through message passing and are permitted autonomy in local decisionmaking. A fundamental property of ADDM systems is stability that refers to their behavior under representative perturbations to their operating environments, given that such systems are intended to be real, complex, and to some extent, mission critical systems, and are subject to unexpected changes in their operating conditions. ADDM systems are closely related to autonomous decentralized systems (ADS) in the principal elements, the difference being that the characteristics and boundaries of ADDM systems are defined rigorously. This paper introduces the concept of stability in ADDM systems and proposes an intuitive yet practical and usable definition that is inspired by those used in Control Systems and Physics. A comprehensive stability analysis on an accurate simulation model will provide the necessary assurance, with a high level of confidence, that the system will perform adequately. An ADDM system is defined as a stable system if it returns to a steady-state in finite time, following perturbation, provided that it is initiated in a steady-state. Equilibrium or steady-state is defined through placing bounds on the measured error in the system. Where the final steady-state is equivalent to the initial one, a system is referred to as ×ØÖÓÒ ÐÝ ×Ø Ð . If the final steady-state is potentially worse then the initial one, a system is deemed Ñ Ö Ò ÐÐÝ ×Ø Ð . When a system fails to return to steady-state following the perturbation, it is unstable. The perturbations are classified as either changes in the input pattern or changes in one or more environmental characteristics of the system such as hardware failures. Thus, the key elements in the study of stability include steady-state, perturbations, and stability. Since the development of rigorous analytical models for most ADDM systems is difficult, if not impossible, the definitions of the key elements, proposed in this paper, constitute a general framework to investigate stability. For a given ADDM system, the definitions are based on the performance indices that must be judiciously identified by the system architect and are likely to be unique. While a comprehensive study of all possible perturbations is too complex and time consuming, this paper focuses on a key subset of perturbations that are important and are likely to occur with greater frequency. To facilitate the understanding of stability in representative real-world systems, this paper reports the analysis of two basic manifestations of ADDM systems that have been reported in the literature-(i) a decentralized military command and control problem, MFAD, and (ii) a novel distributed algorithm with soft reservation for efficient scheduling and congestion mitigation in railway networks, RYN-
Introduction
In the literature, the most comprehensive treatment of stability occurs in the disciplines of Physics and Control Systems. The motivation for defining stability is well stated by Stewart in the foreword of the 1992 translation of A.M. Lyapunov's The General Problem of the Stability of Motion [1] . Stewart notes that Lyapunov recognized that there are many distinct concepts of stability-different ways to formalize the idea that 'small disturbances lead to small changes in the motion' of a physical body. This general concept has applied to a wide range of disciplines from engineering to political science. In each case, however, the definition has been adapted to the area to which it is being applied. This paper will take the same liberties and apply to complex software and hardware systems. However, it will remain motivated by the concept of 'small disturbances lead to small changes in the motion. ' Chen [2] describes three types of stability in control theory: (i) Bounded-Input Bounded-Output, (ii) Marginal Stability and (iii) Asymptotic Stability, that are presented subsequently. Control theory defines them in terms of differential equations, state-space, and transfer function models.
Bounded-Input Bounded-Output Stability
Bounded-Input Bounded-Output (BIBO) stability is defined as one where for every bounded input the output is also bounded. A bounded function has a magnitude that is less than some constant for all time.
Marginal Stability
Marginal stability is generally referred to as Lyapunov's definition of stability and Fuller [1] notes in his introduction that this stemmed from his interest in astronomical problems. For many problems, a perturbation may not be fully dissipated but that it continues to persist, within some bounds, for all time. For example, a particle in a circular trajectory around a point continually oscillates around it and is, therefore, marginally stable. This definition of stability is analogous to the definition of marginal stability adopted in this paper.
Asymptotic Stability
In contrast to marginal stability, asymptotic stability is one where the perturbation is eventually dissipated. Letov [3] , in explaining Lyapunov's Second Theorem, notes that, under asymptotic stability, the disturbed motion converges to an undisturbed state as time progresses to infinity. Control systems engineers find this definition most appealing and it constitutes the basis of the definition of strong stability in this paper.
Casavant [4] , regrets that it is difficult to apply control theory directly to distributed systems in that the mathematical methods generally used are difficult to apply to distributed systems. The difficulty lies in the complex interactions within a distributed system which defies attempts to describe their generally nonlinear behavior through a set of differential equations or transfer functions unless significant simplifications are assumed. In contrast, this paper adopts the approach that control theory is a valuable step in analyzing the properties of distributed systems, even if the accuracy of the evaluation depends on the impact of the simplifications. Many of the basic concepts of control theory apply even where the rigorous mathematical foundations fail to apply.
In the discipline of distributed systems, the issue of stability is discussed relative to the properties of selfstabilization, correctness, i.e. absence of deadlock, robustness, fault-tolerance, and quality of service.
Self-Stabilization
The study of self-stabilization in distributed systems was introduced by Dijkstra in 1973. He writes: "I call a system 'self-stabilizing' when, regardless of its initial state, it is guaranteed to arrive at a legitimate state in a finite number of steps" [5] . Thus, self-stabilization implies that the system is robust enough to recover from an illegal state. The definition of legitimate state is defined by Dijkstra [6] in terms of privileges which are predicates based on a process' own state and that of its immediate neighbors. There are four requirements for a legitimate state:
i. one or more privileges are present. ii. each possible move brings the system to another legitimate state. A move is the act of going to a new state based on the previous state and the states of ones neighbors. iii. each privilege must be in at least one legitimate state. iv. for any pair of legitimate states there is a sequence of moves between one to the other.
Thus, a self-stabilizing system is one in which legitimate and illegitimate states have been identified and the system obeys the above definition. There is a difficulty in finding realistic systems which conform to this definition of legitimate states and privileges. Work has been done in areas such as self-stabilizing approaches to the dining philosophers problem [7] , using only twostate machines for self-stabilization [8] , applying selfstabilization to other areas [9] , [10] , and on the communication and computational cost [11] . The definition of privileges as predicates lends itself to mutual exclusion type problems. While this includes a range of problems which are of interest it is somewhat restrictive. An additional problem is that this definition is based on the identification of specific states and the identification of which global states are legitimate and which are not. This is a very difficult problem as the set of possible states can be enormous for a large and complex system. A more general definition, without the specific definition of privileges, is given by Awerbuch et al. [12] . They write: "Self-stabilization formalizes the following intuitive goal: despite a history of catastrophic failures, once catastrophic failures stop, the system should stabilize to correct behavior without manual intervention." A catastrophic fault is defined as where the global state has been arbitrarily corrupted. This definition is a much more practical one yet goes well beyond Dijkstra's definition. They only become the same if we define 'correct behavior' to be a legitimate state. The definition proposed in this paper espouses this intuitive goal but is not limited to corruptions in state. Awerbuch's work focuses on non-interactive systems and approaches selfstabilization through periodically checking correctness and performing a re-execution whenever a fault has been found. In contrast, the RYNSORD system continuously interacts with the environment and may not be stopped and re-executed due to practical considerations. Also, while the generalized self stabilization definition in [13] deals with transient failures, this paper addresses both transient and permanent failures.
Stable Properties
Related to this model of a distributed system is the definition of stable properties by Chandy and Lamport [14] . They note that if y is a predicate and is a stable property of a distributed system D then in a computation of D, once y is true, it remains true for the remainder of the computation. Other researchers including Venkatesan and Garg [15] , [16] use stable 'predicate' rather than property. The two examples provided in [14] are that 'computation has terminated' and 'the system is deadlocked.' Additionally, a stable property can be defined for only a phase of an algorithm, that is a subset of the entire execution of the program. An example of this is an algorithm which requires the computation in one phase to terminate before commencing the next phase. So detection of this termination, a stable property, would be a critical element of the algorithm. The detection of stable properties, especially for termination and deadlock detection, has been the subject of considerable research. However this definition of stable properties is very different in that it deals with properties defined as predicates of the system while the definition proposed in this paper deals with stability in a system-wide perspective. For instance, deadlock is con-sidered to be a stable property in [14] . In contrast, in this paper, if a system were to deadlock, it would result in the system being unstable. This apparent contradiction reflects the view that system stability is based on bounding the error in a system and that a deadlocked system is a case of infinite error. The assumption here is that the system is not designed to deadlock, as is the case with RYNSORD and most practical systems, so this is a characteristic of an unstable system. Robustness Robustness is the ability to maintain correct behavior despite changes in the system. Schreiber [17] makes the distinction between robustness and fail-soft behavior by the type of errors; for robustness they are errors in the inputs and for fail-soft behavior they are faults in the system. Stankovic [18] offers a different definition, stating that "in the computer science literature, robustness normally refers to the ability of a system to handle failures." The disagreement lies in the scope of the definition. Schreiber's definition is limited to only errors in the input while Stankovic describes it in terms of 'failures.' Meyer [19] identifies four properties for distributed real-time systems: 1) Concurrency, 2) Timeliness, 3) Fault tolerance and 4) Degradable performance in the presence of faults. In control theory, a robust system is one that performs correctly despite perturbations in its state. This paper is concerned with the performance impact of both failures as well as changes in input patterns. Perturbations do not necessarily imply a failure but represent any changes in the normal operating environment, and therefore, the definition proposed in this paper encompasses robustness, fail-soft behavior and degradable performance. Fault-tolerance Fault tolerance [20] is concerned with making the system resilient against failures in the system, which is fundamentally different from the concerns of this paper. The concern of stability is the performance after the fault, not how to recover from the fault. For example, suppose a system uses a replicated database to provide fault-tolerance. If the original fails then the secondary takes over once the failure is detected. The period of time, between the original failure and the recovery, is considered the perturbation duration. However, the secondary may provide a degraded level of service, thus the overall performance of the system, while adequate, may be less than it was before the failure. This is defined as marginally stable. If the system while using the secondary database is able to provide the same performance as with the primary, then the system is strongly stable. Finally, if the secondary database is unable to handle the workload and the performance degrades as some function of time, it is declared unstable.
Quality of Service
In [21] Garg et al. have defined stability for distributed applications. They have also adopted a performance perspective for stability and have chosen to use the Quality of Service (QoS) provided to the user as their performance index. They define a stable distributed application as one where the QoS is bounded for all time, including during the perturbation. The definition is limited in that, first QoS attributes do not relate to RYNSORD and other systems and second, the error during a perturbation may be unbounded. This paper derives inspiration from marginal and asymptotic stability. Its aim is to present a conceptually different definition of stability, one based on the issue of performance and not correctness. The objective is to provide a practical methodology to aid in the advancement of ADDM systems. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces ADDM systems and presents a formal definition of stability in ADDM systems. Sections 3 and 4 illustrate the definition through two representative ADDM systems, MFAD and RYNSORD. Finally, Sect. 5 presents some conclusions.
Formal Definition of Stability in ADDM Systems
This section introduces the concept of stability and presents a definition. Although it may apply to a broader range of distributed systems, the proposed definition is restricted strictly to ADDM systems. ADDM systems constitute a special class of distributed systems and their key characteristics are as follows: (i) The system is organized through a number of distributed, possibly geographically-dispersed, entities, (ii) the entities execute concurrently, independently, and autonomously, (iii) the behavior of the entities and the inter-entity communications are asynchronous, (iv) the system is provably correct, and (v) the entities collectively and cooperatively solve a single real-world problem through decentralized decision-making. The potential benefits of ADDM systems include scalability, high throughput, and robustness. Examples of ADDM systems include the distributed routing algorithm for ATM networks [22] , YADDES [23] , NO-VAHID [24] , DICAF [25] , DARYN [26] , RYNSORD [27] , MFAD [28] , and ATOS [29] . The ATOS: Autonomous Decentralized Transport Operation System, controls the world's largest transportation systemEast Japan Railway Company. Designed and built by Hitachi, ATOS includes 5000 autonomous computers that control 6,200 trains/day. While the execution of an ADDM system is aimed at achieving its respective goal, it may be driven either by (A) temporal inputs asserted externally, (B) initial conditions, or a combination of (A) and (B). "A" and "B" constitute the two basic manifestations of ADDM systems. Examples of "A" include RYNSORD [27] and NOVAHID [24] while that of "B" include MFAD [28] . ADDM systems, by nature, are large-scale and complex. While the nature of the computation and interaction in every ADDM system may be unique, the computational model for all ADDM systems include two fundamental inherent characteristicsasynchronicity and concurrency. The combination of these characteristics strongly resists any attempt to develop accurate and realistic characterizations of ADDM systems using the current mathematical structures. This paper adopts an engineering approach and presents a definition of or equivalently a methodology for measuring the stability of ADDM systems that is based on performance and is practically usable. As discussed in Sect. 1, the current definitions of stability either do not apply to ADDM systems or yield metrics that have limited practical use. The intent of this paper is to define stability [30] in terms of performance criteria so as to provide performance guarantees for the system in a dynamically changing environment. Ferrari [31] defines performance as an indication of how well a system, already assumed to be correct, works. Typical examples would include the output rate, system delay, etc. Thus, a critical concept for ADDM systems is a need for a quantitative error measurement which is referred to as a user defined, measurable quantity. The three requirements for the error criteria are as follows: First, it is a quantifiable value. Second, conceptually, it represents the deviation of the system from some ideal, so the ideal must also be quantifiable. Third, the user desires to minimize the error quantity, a logical goal. The definition of error will depend solely on the application problem, as presented subsequently. Therefore, it is loosely defined as a userdefined measurable quantity and an exact definition is not presented here.
Although the notion of time to converge may provide valuable information on how fast the perturbation dissipates, it is not included in the definition of stability in this paper, for two reasons. First, the concept of strong stability is based on Lyapunov's asymptotic stability which requires the perturbation to disappear as time progresses to infinity. The inclusion of a time bound, T , would imply that a system that converges at T + 1 or later instead of within T is unstable, which would contradict the premise of asymptotic stability. Second, the objective of this paper is a metric where the difference between a strongly stable and an unstable system is clearly pronounced in an engineering sense. The introduction of time bounds would cause stability to assume a more subtle nature. The aim of the paper, in essence, is to address the question-will the system ever recover from the perturbation? If it partially recovers, it is marginally stable. If it does recover completely, it is strongly stable. If it will never recover, it is unstable. The authors hope that this definition will serve as a good starting point and stimulate further discussion within the community.
Definition 1 (Error quantity):
A quantitative measurement of the system's performance which is expressed as error = |ideal − actual|. Both ideal and actual must be measurable or computable.
Definition 2:
The equilibrium or steady-state for a distributed system is defined simply as the operational environment, i.e. set of inputs and system resources, under which the system operates when the error is bounded by some finite constant for all time. The exact magnitude of this bound is unspecified except that it must be less than some constant which is less than infinity.
Definition 3:
The equilibrium or steady-state (A quantitative representation of the preceding definition): If a system exists in a steady-state then the error of the system, e, is defined by e < K < ∞ for all time where K is an arbitrary constant.
The primary focus of defining stability is in what happens to the system, in a steady state, following a change in the environment, termed perturbations, that are inevitable in a real-world environment. The changes are classified into two categories: System level perturbations and Input perturbations. System level perturbations are generally those which are considered as faults or failures. These include all forms of hardware failures as well as the arbitrary corruption of local states. Input perturbations are changes in the manner, or rate, of the input into the RYNSORD system.
A perturbation is described in terms of the assumption it has violated. An assumption is described as a characteristic of the steady-state operating environment. Although multiple perturbations may conceivably affect the system simultaneously, this paper limits a perturbation to a single change in the environment.
Definition 4 (Perturbation):
A perturbation is a violation of an assumption which is specified by the nature of the violation, the magnitude when applicable, and two time values: t pert is the time at which the perturbation occurs and t pert end signifying the end of the changes to the system. Also t pert dur = t pert end −t pert , is defined as the perturbation duration.
Although the definition of perturbation duration, presented earlier, is logical, it may appear confusing under special scenarios. Under such scenarios, t pert dur is assigned the symbol φ. This paper is generally interested in measuring the steady-state system behavior prior to the initiation of perturbation and following the termination of the perturbation, to quantify the impact of the perturbation. The paper is generally not interested in the system behavior while the system is under the influence of perturbation since a number of transient processes may be at play including automatic recovery mechanisms. However, this paper is interested in stability analysis for permanent perturbations. Therefore, under such circumstances, the assignment of ∞ to t pert dur would require one to wait up to time ∞ before obtaining measurements, i.e. preclude one from analyzing stability. The assignment of ∞ to t pert dur signifies this special case and measurements are obtained for a ADDM system while it is permanently perturbed.
Definition 5 (Stability): If a system is in a steady state and a perturbation occurs, it will return to a steady state as t → ∞. Let K 1 be the bounds on the original steady state and K 2 be the bound on the final steady state. If K 2 ≤ K 1 the system is strong stable, otherwise it is marginally stable.
The final steady state, as per Lyapunov's asymptotic stability, refers to the final steady state in the asymptotic sense. The distinction between strong and marginal stability is an important one. Given a strongly stable system, its steady-state, and a perturbation, following repeated applications of the perturbation, the system will eventually return to a steady-state that is either better than or equal to, in terms of the error bound, to its original steady-state. In contrast, following a perturbation, a marginally stable system may result in a steady-state with a worse error bound. Furthermore, repeated applications of the perturbation may exhibit a growing error bound. In the worst case, a periodic perturbation may either drive the system into instability or the error may oscillate between consecutive perturbations. Thus, whether or not marginal stability is acceptable is dependent of the application and the user. Conceivably, a specific error may be bounded by a finite value for a given problem. This is true for the MFAD system, described subsequently, where the maximum sensor error is restricted to 180
• . Therefore, while the system will always remain in steady-state and therefore deemed marginally stable, the key question for such systems is whether it is strongly stable. This paper defines two related classes of stability, distinguished by the perturbations to which they correspond: Input Stability and System-level Stability.
Definition 6 (Input Stability): Stability related to input perturbations, i.e. input rate, distribution, or magnitude.
Definition 7 (System-level Stability):
Stability related to system level perturbations. The definition is inclusive of anything other than input perturbations, examples being component failures, i.e. links and nodes, and component degradation, i.e. dropped messages.
Stability Analysis of a Decentralized Military Command and Control Problem, MFAD

Overview of the MFAD System
MFAD [28] refers to a mathematical framework, based on the Kohn-Nerode [32] distributed hybrid control paradigm, wherein a decentralized military command and control decision-making algorithm is synthesized from a centralized description of the problem. In contrast to the traditional centralized control, the decentralized model is increasingly appropriate in today's military, given the sophisticated training, education, and data gathering, fusing, and processing capability at the level of every individual unit. The representative battlefield consists of a number of tank units, each of which is designed to optimize a Lagrangian [11] , a local, dynamically evolving, non-negative cost criterion, subject to the constraints imposed by the global objectives and principles. Every entity utilizes its local information, encapsulated through an internal state vector, its local goals, and appropriate coordination information obtained from other entities, to determine its decisions autonomously, independently, asynchronously, yet cooperatively, so as to achieve the desired global performance. Every tank is granted autonomy in making its own decisions with respect to sensor, movement, and target management. There is no centralized decision-making in MFAD. Compared to the centralized control system, the distributed decision-making system can process information faster and react to dynamic changes to the environment quicker. However, since each entity computes decisions autonomously, key global information must be made available to them. This is achieved by each individual tank sharing essential and relevant information with its peers and forms the core of the distributed Lagrangians. The distributed system is expected to exhibit robustness, i.e. resistance to catastrophic failure and scalability. That is, as the system grows in size due to increasing number of entities, the number of computing engines will increase proportionately and the system is expected to continue to deliver undiminished performance. The joint state of all entities is the operative evolving state of the entire system and is referred to as the "carrier manifold" state in [33] . In the decentralized algorithm under MFAD, the overall decision task is distributed among the individual tanks which are geographically dispersed in the battlefield. The individual tank computes and executes its decisions and communicates with its peers, asynchronously. When a tank possesses information about the enemy that may impact a peer, it propagates the information directly to the peer. The decentralized algorithm is mathematically synthesized from the centralized algorithm and is, therefore, correct by construction. Last, all of the tanks are cooperatively engaged in solving a single problem-destroying the enemy to win the battle.
In MFAD, there are no external inputs to the system. For every tank, the data generated by its sensor and those received from its peers constitute the input. The output consists of its decisions and information that it propagated to its peers. Thus, an output at a time instant is not just a response to the input at that time instant. Instead, it is a response corresponding to all of the inputs to the entire set of tanks up to that time instant. While this poses difficulty in defining an error criterion in terms of the output-input relationship, the Lagrangian approach produces a natural error criteria, based on the difference between the "ideal" decision and the actual decision, realized by each unit at every time instance.
Consider a centralized decision-making system corresponding to MFAD. The underlying algorithm has access to the entire system state. However, the combination of the (i) latency of the information received at the centralized entity from the subordinates, (ii) the delay resulting from the significant computational need, and (iii) the latency of execution of the decisions by the subordinates following their propagation from the centralized entity, hinder the generation of high quality decisions. In contrast, the decentralized algorithm underlying MFAD successfully addresses the issues (ii) and (iii), but the lack of access to the total system state limits the quality of its decisions. MFAD [28] proposes a hypothetical entity, Perfect Global Optimization Device (PGOD) that is capable of generating perfect decisions. By definition, PGOD transcends time in that it is capable of acquiring any and all knowledge at any spatial location in the system instantaneously, i.e. unaffected by the finite rate of propagation of information that characterizes the physical world. Thus, PGOD utilizes the perfect information and generates perfect decisions and while they may never be realized in the real world, they serve as the absolute standard for comparing the effectiveness of the distributed and centralized paradigms.
A series of experiments are designed with the "Blue" and "Red" forces implementing the MFAD and the centralized approach, respectively. In the military terminology, Blue refers to the US forces while Red refers to the Red Army of the former USSR. The decision vectors computed by each of the "n" entities at every timestep are logged, and the overall decision vector for the entire system is expressed through UD(t). UD(t), in turn, is synthesized from its subcomponents-movement, sensor, and target decision vectors.
For the hypothetical entity, PGOD, the state vectors of every entity and the sighting reports from the entities are assumed to be available to it instantaneously at time instant t, i.e. without incurring any propagation delay. PGOD employs the same algorithm as the centralized approach and computes the decision vector for each entity. These vectors are considered ideal because they are not subject to the latency inherent in the centralized paradigm and the decision process utilizes PGOD's knowledge of the total system state unlike the decentralized paradigm. The perfect decision vector is labeled UI(t). The UD(t), UI(t), and the error criterion, E d (t), presented subsequently, are comprised of their movement and sensor components.
Modeling and Assumptions for Stability Analysis
Unlike in MFAD [28] where the weapon range is assumed to be 3000 spatial units, in this investigation, the range is deliberately limited to 300 spatial units. While this reduces the probability of entities being destroyed, the increased number of decisions determined by them during the simulation constitutes a higher quality of input data to the computation of stability. The stability measure reflects the quality of the decisions, not the number of entities destroyed. The MFAD simulation models two delays-(i) the peer entity to peer entity communication delay, and (ii) decision computing delay. For simplicity and without any loss in generality, this paper assigns the same value, a positive integer, τ c , to every peer entity to peer entity communication delay. The decision computing delay, τ p , models the computing time needed to minimize the cost function. Given that MFAD is a decentralized system where the overall decision task is shared by all entities, each entity is expected to compute decisions quickly, implying τ p = zero. In MFAD, the sensor data acquired by every entity along with information received from its peers constitutes its input. Therefore, the input perturbation may assume the form of reduced sensor capability which may correspond to, for instance, reduced visibility from smoke and confusion in the battlefield. The system level perturbation may consist of communication failures between the entities which, in turn, may be caused by enemy jamming. Conceivably, the initial conditions including the locations and orientations of the entities will impact the results of the analysis. This paper, however, is limited to a single set of stochastically generated locations and orientations for the entities.
Steady-State Analysis
In MFAD, the movement and sensor error criteria are intrinsically bounded. The errors are computed every timestep which is equal to 0.1 second. The sensor error, computed as the absolute difference between the ideal sensor axis and the actual sensor axis, is bounded by 180
• . The maximum error of 180
• occurs when the ideal and actual sensor axes are pointing in exactly opposite directions. For simplicity, the movement error is computed as the difference of the magnitudes of the 
Input Stability Analysis
Given that the input to every entity is comprised of the data acquired through its sensors, input perturbation may be emulated through degrading the sensor performance, i.e. limiting their effective range, either temporarily or permanently. The perturbations correspond to the inevitable smoke and confusion in the battlefield and is dynamic. Table 1 tabulates the average sensor error prior to, during, and following sensor perturbations, corresponding to temporary and permanent perturbations that reduce the effective sensor range to 33% and 66% respectively, of its original value. Under normal conditions, the key system error values are obtained for either prior to or following perturbation. However, the permanent perturbation, i.e. for infinite duration, scenario is considered an exception and the error value following the perturbation is measured immediately following the assertion of the perturbation. The results in Table 1 reveal that when the effective sensor range is degraded to 33% of its normal value, for either a temporary duration of 50 timesteps or permanently, the average sensor error following the perturbation is relatively high. Figure 1 presents the average sensor error magnitude as a function of the simulation time, for sensor range degraded to 33% of its normal value, and contrasts it against the sensor error without perturbation. The graphs in Fig. 1 reveal that the primary contribution to the error occurs between timesteps 100 and 170. The perturbation is asserted at 50 timesteps. Thus, severe sensor perturbations result in serious sensor errors. Conceivably, during a serious sensor perturbation, the tank unit fails to sight an enemy and when the sensor range is restored following the termination of the perturbation, the enemy unit may have moved out of the field of view, leaving behind the lingering effect of the sensor error well past the perturbation duration. Where the sensor range is degraded to only 66% of its original value, the sensor error returns, at the end of the perturbation duration, close to the value prior to the initiation of the perturbation. Table 2 presents the average movement decision error values prior to, during, and following a perturbation, for sensor ranges degraded to 33% and 66% of their original values respectively, and for temporary and permanent degradations. A comparative analysis of the data, i.e. average errors before and after perturbations, in Tables 1 and 2 reveal that the impact of sensor perturbations on movement decision error is less severe than on the sensor decision error.
Perturbations to System Characteristics and Stability Analysis
The basic infrastructure of MFAD assumes that every entity is able to communicate with its peers. However, Tables 3 and 4. While Table 3 records the average sensor decision error values, prior to, during, and following the temporary and permanent perturbations, the data in Table 4 correspond to the movement decisions. The results indicate that communication perturbations bear a slightly greater impact on the movement decision errors relative to the sensor decision errors. In contrast, recall that the sensor perturbation had a greater impact on the sensor error than the movement error. Figure 2 presents the movement and sensor decision errors as a function of the simulation time, for both sensor and communication perturbations. Given that the perturbations are asserted at timestep 50, the behaviors of each graph relative to its value prior to timestep 50, corroborate the conclusions derived from Tables 1, 2 , 3, and 4.
Summary of Stability Analysis of MFAD
MFAD is observed to exhibit strong stability for perturbations of finite durations. Although it is intrinsically marginally stable, the final steady states following certain perturbations may be fatal and, therefore, unacceptable. The results of analysis may be utilized to uncover potential weaknesses for the most likely per- turbations and suggest corrective measures.
Stability Analysis of RYNSORD
Overview of RYNSORD
RYNSORD [27] is a decentralized algorithm with "soft" reservation, explained subsequently, for efficient scheduling and congestion mitigation in railway networks. It is designed and developed to explore a decentralized approach to railway management. In essence, each train is granted the autonomy to route itself from origin to destination. The specific route that it will eventually take is not specified, nor is the timing of that route. RYNSORD the total travel time of each train rather than the total distance traveled.
The RYNSORD approach for railway networks is novel and defined by the following characteristics. First, it is decentralized in that the overall task of routing all trains through the network is shared by all entities in the system-trains and station nodes. The routing is dynamic, i.e. the choice of the successive tracks as a train proceeds towards its final destination, takes into account the actual demand of the tracks by other trains in the system. What makes RYNSORD unique among all disciplines including modern communications networks is that every mobile agent-the train, possesses intelligence, information gathering facilities, and autonomy to solely and completely determine its own routing. Trains ride on tracks and safety concerns demand that a train first gains exclusive reservation guarantee from the owner node of a track prior to propagating on it. Conceivably, a train can insist on reserving every track from origin to destination along its chosen route before starting its journey. Such an approach may lock the train to far-away tracks too soon, based on old information, and thereby fail to take advantage of better route choices which may become available as time progresses. On the contrary, the RYNSORD approach utilizes a lookahead N wherein every train requests reservations at intervals of N tracks and a specific reservation entails the acquisition of approvals of N subsequent tracks along its route towards its destination, before it resumes its travel. Within the reservation process for N subsequent tracks, RYNSORD proposes a novel concept-"soft reservation." In the traditional, "hard reservation," a train issues N consecutive requests for N tracks at specific time instances. The owner stations for the corresponding tracks will either approve or disapprove the reservation, depending on whether the respective tracks are free at the requested time instances. Thus, when a train requests a track from time t 1 to t 2 and even if the station notes that the track is occupied up to time t 1 +1 but free thereafter, it will still refuse approval. Then the train will have to try an alternate track. Assume that the alternate track is a worse solution than if the train had waited idly for 1 time unit and then utilized the original track. If the train had been aware of the knowledge possessed by the station, it could have idled 1 time unit and opted for the better solution. Thus, with regard to reservation, the nodes' behaviors are binary and rigid. In contrast, RYNSORD proposes soft reservation wherein a train specifies monotonically increasing time instants to the successive station nodes corresponding to the N subsequent tracks. In turn, a node grants approval at either the requested time instant or the earliest time instant beyond the requested time instants when the track is available. These characteristics are expected to endow RYNSORD with strong stability properties.
In RYNSORD, a railway network is assumed to 
Stability Analysis
Error Criteria for Stability Analysis
The key performance measures in RYNSORD are the travel times required by the trains to reach their destinations and the average number of trains waiting at each station. Since stability is measured through performance behavior, this paper proposes two error criteria, I and II, that are designed to capture the deviation of the performance measures from standard, benchmark values. In the discipline of distributed systems, centralized algorithms corresponding to the distributed algorithms usually serve as the standard benchmarks. This paper proposes a novel benchmark-ideal performance measures. The ideal travel time for each train is the time required for the train to travel the shortest path from origin to destination, in the total absence of any competing trains. The ideal number of trains waiting at any time instance at any station is zero. While these ideal values may be achieved in the total absence of any competing trains and are impractical, they are absolute minimum values and ideally suited as benchmarks. The reasons for selecting the ideal performance values are as follows. First, the ideal measures serve as absolute benchmark values. Second, a centralized algorithm based system for RYNSORD may not be practically feasible. The error criterion I is expressed as,
where the actual travel time of a train is computed as the time elapsed between the time the train is asserted into the system, in the presence of other competing trains, and the time the train reaches its destination. The error criterion II is expressed as, error = |actual number of trains waiting at a station|. Although both error criteria aim to achieve the best overall performance, they may be at odds under certain scenarios. The errors are computed every timestep which is equal to 1 minute. To minimize the travel times of trains, the first error criterion may encourage a train to wait at a specific station along an optimal route until a track from it becomes available for travel. In contrast, the second error criterion may encourage the train to keep moving, while the optimal routes are occupied, through selecting longer and slower routes. Although RYNSORD selects routes based on minimizing travel time and does not directly consider the time spent waiting at the stations, both error criteria exhibit similar stability properties, reflecting the fact that the average waiting queue size and travel time for each train are related. A real implementation of RYNSORD is a continuously running system. However, in this paper, the simulation maintains both start and finish. Simulation is initiated with no trains in the system and the timestep set to one. The system is then executed until the end time, which for most of the experiments in this analysis correspond to 17,280 timesteps or 12 operational days. Following the initiation of simulation, the trains asserted into the system experience very little contending traffic which appears to extend superior performance for these trains. These trains are not considered in the performance analysis of RYNSORD. Following the termination of simulation corresponding to a predetermined timestep, there may be trains still in progress in the system. These trains are marked as been asserted but never having reached their destinations, and are not considered in the performance data. In computing the results, RYNSORD only considers those trains that have successfully completed their journeys.
Steady-State Analysis
Since any error analysis of a system, caused by perturbations, is relative to its normal behavior, it is imperative to first identify the steady state behavior of the system. This subsection presents a steady state analysis of RYNSORD and identifies a key criterion as the input traffic distribution. Given that freight trains dominate passenger trains in RYNSORD, this paper assumes that the assertion of trains into RYNSORD follow a uniform distribution over time. Unlike a bursty traffic model, a uniform distribution is likely to imply a constant level of network usage, leading to efficient use of resources. At every station, the probability of a train originating at that station at each timestep, is defined as the input rate. For every train originating at a station, train speeds are generated stochastically, ranging from 60 mph to 100 mph. The final destination is also generated stochastically by assigning equal weight to every station, except the originating station, and selecting a station at random. Geographic proximity plays no part in the selection process. Since major stations, corresponding to major urban centers, are more likely to encounter high traffic densities, a set of nine "high traffic" stations are identified-Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, Philadelphia, New York, Washington, Pittsburgh, Columbus, and Cincinnati. For the stations corresponding to these cities, the input train traffic density is set at 0.3, which, as shown later, is well above the maximum steady-state rate for the system. However, as the steady-state analysis will show, the presence of these high traffic stations does not prevent the system from achieving a global steady-state. Also, during the process of selecting final destinations of trains, these cities are assigned twice the weight of other stations.
A trial and error approach is utilized to determine the steady-state conditions. RYNSORD is simulated corresponding to different input rate values. Table 5 summarizes the average number of input trains that are generated corresponding to different input rate choices. Analysis reveals that, corresponding to an input rate of 0.125, shown in Fig. 3 , the error does not continue to increase as time increases and, as a result, RYN-SORD is considered to exhibit steady-state behavior corresponding to the input rate of 0.125. In contrast, for an input rate of 0.175, the error clearly grows as a function of time, reflecting non steady-state behavior. For the input rate of 0.140, RYNSORD exhibits both bounded behavior and growth depending on the specific stochastic input, reflecting that this input rate marks the boundary between bounded and unbounded error. As expected, different steady-state conditions exhibit different error bound values, as revealed in Fig. 4 for the error criterion II corresponding to steady-state input rates ranging from 0.05 to 0.125. 
Perturbations to the Input Rate and Stability Analysis
As with any real world system, RYNSORD is designed to execute in steady-state but is likely to encounter periods of rapid fluctuation of input rates arising from any number of unforeseen circumstances. Thus, the most logical perturbation to the input rate in RYNSORD consists of an abrupt increase in the input traffic rate, sustained for a short duration. Along with the magnitude of the increase in the input rate and the length of duration of the perturbation, the choice of the steadystate operating point of RYNSORD is likely to influence the stability. It is desired that the RYNSORD design reflect a strongly stable system, i.e. it returns to the original steady-state, at least, within finite time, following the termination of the perturbation. A number of experiments are designed and executed wherein first a steady-state RYNSORD system is exposed, one at a time, to different perturbation, under different original steady-state operating points. Second, the error criteria I and II are measured as simulation progresses and analyzed. Table 6 summarizes the system characteristics under three different input rate perturbations. The magnitudes of the three perturbations are designed to push RYNSORD successively further beyond the steadystate point. The graphs for the error criterion I are not shown here. Figure 5 presents the error criterion II for each of the three scenarios, as a function of the simulation time. In the graphs for error criterion I, the error magnitudes increase immediately following the perturbations. However, as time progresses, the error magnitudes decrease, with RYNSORD ultimately returning to the original steady-state point for all three cases. Thus, RYNSORD is strongly stable with respect to input perturbations.
Perturbations to System Characteristics and Stability Analysis
The basic infrastructure of RYNSORD assumes that every train is able to communicate with an appropriate station and that stations can communicate between themselves. Although the RYNSORD algorithm does not explicitly take into consideration the possibility of track failures, trains are capable of determining alternate routes when one or more tracks are in use or un- available. This subsection presents an investigation into the stability of the RYNSORD algorithm under such failures.
Perturbations to Inter-station and Train-tostation Communications
Interactions between stations and between a train and a station constitute the key communications in RYN-SORD without which trains can neither succeed in reserving tracks nor travel towards their destinations. The correctness requirement prevents a train from traveling on a track segment unless it has been granted explicit reservation. Should a reservation request, initiated by a train, remain unanswered, the train will never attempt to use the track in question. Thus, perturbations that are deliberately introduced in this paper to affect the reservation process will bear no impact on RYNSORD's correctness. The characteristics of the perturbations are as follows. A message propagated from one station to another never arrives at the destination. Also, a communication between a station and a train does not reach the receiver. Under such scenarios, the behavior of a train in RYNSORD is as follows. When a train does not receive a reply to its reservation request, it decides to travel on the alternate path, where available, rather than wait indefinitely for the response. When responses to both of its requests for reservation fail to arrive, the train temporarily alters its lookahead to unity and renews its reservation effort. Unless both communications links along which the train propagates its reservation requests are down, which is unlikely, the most recent action by the train ensures at least one reservation response. When the unlikely event occurs, the train waits at the station and renews its reservation effort at the subsequent timestep with the restored lookahead value. Conceivably, computer communication failures are relatively short lived and this paper reasons that it is logical to wait for a single timestep within which the communication link is likely restored as opposed to engaging in a very round-about detour. It is pointed out that a communication failure between two stations does not eliminate all uses of the corresponding track segment. The failure only affects those trains that attempt at reservation through the non-owner station since the messages never arrive at the owner which alone has sole capability in committing the reservation. Trains traveling from the station that owns the track are able to request and use the track.
A number of experiments are designed to measure stability: A number of different communications links are subject to failure, different failure durations are selected ranging up to permanent failure, and different values for the input traffic rate are utilized. The objective is to analyze the impact of communications perturbation on RYNSORD and to determine a traffic input rate for which RYNSORD is stable under perturbations. In the first experiment, two sets of three and eight links are forced to fail separately. The links are identified subsequently through the stations at either ends. Care is exercised to avoid failing a link that is the only communication path from any station to the remainder of the network. While the set of three links are suspected high traffic links, the choice of the set of eight links reflect the desire to distribute failures throughout the network. The simulation is executed for 17,280 timesteps for steady-state input rates of 0.05 and 0.125 respectively. The failures are asserted at timestep 5760 and last for a duration of 1440 timesteps. Thus, t pert = 5760, while t pert end = 5760 + 1440 = 7200. The choice of the failure duration of 1440 timesteps, which corresponds to one full day of actual operation, reflects adequate time for repairs. In another set of experiments, the links are forced to fail permanently, i.e. Table 7 summarizes the performance results and reveals that RYNSORD is strongly stable with respect to failures of finite duration. Given the higher probability of communication failures repaired quickly, the results are encouraging. However, for permanent perturbations in both sets of links, RYNSORD is observed to be marginally stable and unstable under input traf- fic rates of 0.05 and 0.125, respectively. Clearly, the boundary between marginal stability and instability is a function of the input traffic rate, the number of tracks failed, and the specific tracks failed. It is pointed out that the error criterion II mirrors the behavior of error criterion I. The results for the set of 3 tracks failed are similar to those for the set of 8 tracks and are not presented here. However, a comparative analysis of error criterion II for the two sets of tracks failed reveals the following. While RYNSORD is marginally stable for both cases, the final steady-state point for the set of 3 links is worse, i.e. higher error bound value, relative to that for the set of 8 links. The result clearly underscores the importance of the specific links failed over the number of links failed and a likely cause is the degree of congestion. Further, off-line analysis, i.e. following the termination of simulation, reveals that a total of 201 trains utilized one or more of the set of 3 links are used in their shortest paths. In contrast, only 167 trains utilized one or more of the set of 8 links. Thus, stability analysis may contribute towards identifying communications links whose failure are more likely to adversely impact the performance. Perturbations Relative to the Track Segments A track may become unavailable following an accident, breakdown, sabotage, or due to routine maintenance. Although RYNSORD by design lacks elaborate mechanism to handle such failures, upon occurrence of a failure, the stations at the two endpoints of the track segment become aware within a single timestep, i.e. 60 seconds of actual operation. Also, a train already traveling on a track segment at the time of the failure will continue to travel and reach the other end safely. The stations at the endpoints will prevent future trains from using the track by canceling all reservations and by forcibly initiating re-route computations for all affected trains.
An experiment is designed wherein the tracks corresponding to the two sets of 3 and 8 links, described earlier in the paper, are subject to failure. The performance results, presented in Table 8 are identical to those for the communications perturbations ( Table 7) . The error criteria graphs are also similar in behavior to those for the communications perturbations except that there are key differences. Consider the failure of the 8 links for a finite duration of 1440 timesteps, under high input traffic rate. While RYNSORD is strongly stable relative to both kinds of perturbations and the behaviors of the error criterion II graphs corresponding to communications link failures and corresponding track failures are similar asymptotically, the magnitude of the error for communications perturbation is significantly worse than for track perturbation. In contrast, consider the permanent failure of the 8 links under low input traffic rate. While RYNSORD is observed to be marginally stable for both communications link failures and corresponding track failures and their asymptotic behaviors are similar, the error magnitude corresponding to communications perturbation is considerably higher than for track perturbation. A possible explanation lies in the fact that while only the failed track becomes unavailable to a train, a communication link failure may impair a train's ability to compete for reservation and therefore, travel access, for multiple tracks.
Summary of Stability Analysis of RYNSORD
The stability analysis of RYNSORD has revealed that it is strongly stable with respect to perturbations of finite durations to the input traffic rate and track segment failures. For permanent perturbations, the stability measure is dependent on the input traffic rate prior to the onset of the perturbation. However, it is weak with respect to communication link failures and the underlying algorithm needs redesign for superior immunity to perturbations.
Conclusions
This paper has introduced the concept of stability in ADDM systems and has proposed an intuitive definition that is insipred by those used in Control Systems and Physics. A comprehensive stability analysis on an accurate simulation model will provide the necessary assurance, with a high level of confidence, that the system will perform adequately. An ADDM system is defined as a stable system if it returns to a steady-state in finite time, following perturbation, provided that it is initiated in a steady-state. Equilibrium or steadystate is defined through placing bounds on the measured error in the system. Where the final steady-state is equivalent to the initial one, the system is referred to as strongly stable. If the final steady-state is potentially worse then the initial one, the system is deemed marginally stable. The perturbations are classified as either changes in the input pattern or changes in one or more characteristics of the system such as hardware failures. To facilitate the understanding of stability in representative real-world systems, this paper has reported the analysis of two ADDM systems-(i) a decentralized military command and control problem, MFAD, and (ii) a novel distributed algorithm with soft reservation for efficient scheduling and congestion mitigation in railway networks, RYNSORD, both of which have been proposed in the literature. Stability analysis of MFAD and RYNSORD yields key stable and unstable conditions. A system determined to be stable provides the reassurance that the system will perform well under adverse conditions. In contrast, a system deemed unstable reflects the need to address key weaknesses in the system design. Performance analysis reveals that MFAD is strongly stable to perturbations of short durations, it is inherently marginally stable, the sensor degradation bears a greater impact on sensor error than movement error, and the impact of communication failure is higher on movement error as opposed to sensor error. RYNSORD is strongly stable with respect to input traffic rate perturbations of finite durations. However, it is marginally stable to unstable under permanent track segment and communications link failures reflecting a balanced assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of RYNSORD.
